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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The effect of the decision is to further extend the right of individuals to
appeal in forma pauperis.
IMPROPER REmARKS BY COURT CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
A new trial was granted in People v. Bai22 on the grounds that judicial
error in the trial court denied defendant of due process of law as guaranteed
by the State23 and Federal2 4 Constitutions and the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure.25
Defendant had been convicted in Nassau County District Court for assault
in the third degree,2 and the conviction was affirmed by the County Court.
At his trial defendant appeared without counsel, his attorney having
withdrawn from the case, and requested an adjournment. Since several previous
requests had been made and granted for the same reason, the trial court denied
a further extension. Defendant reluctantly proceeded to conduct his own de-
fense, but disclaimed ability to examine twenty-seven witnesses he had sub-
poenaed. The trial judge construed this as an authorization to discharge them
and accordingly did so.
Appellant contends the judgment should be reversed for two reasons.
First, he was forced to stand trial without counsel and thereby deprived of a fair
hearing and secondly, the trial judge improperly prevented him from examining
a written statement of a witness for the prosecution which was in the possession
of the authorities.
The Court of Appeals held as to the first contention, that from the facts
of the case, defendant was given sufficient time to obtain an attorney. If he
chose to appear without one as a result of his own inaction, he must be deemed
to have waived his right to legal representation. To hold otherwise would give
the accused the complete power to block every prosecution by this method.
This is in accord with settled New York law.27
The Court did feel, however, that the trial judge was without authority
in dismissing the witnesses subpoenaed by the defendant. Nowhere in the
record did the defendant request them either to remain or to be discharged,
but simlpy indicated that he was unable to conduct a proper examination.
Since a trial was to be conducted, it was defendant's right to have his wit-
nesses present.
The Court also held that it was error for the trial judge to mention an
appeal in the presence of the jury. The judge had stated "if you buy this
record on an appeal, every one of those words will cost you more." The fact
that there was an endeavor to correct this statement in the charge was not
22. 7 N.Y.2d 152, 196 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1959).
23. N.Y. Const. Art. I, § 6.
24. U.S. Const Amend. XIV.
25. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 415.
26. N.Y. Penal Law § 244(1).
27. People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377 (1955).
COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
enough. "The court's impression of the defendant's guilt stood out so strongly
that formal instructions could not cure the damages."'
On these grounds, the Court stated that the conviction should be reversed.
As to defendant's second contention, the Court held that since there is to be
a new trial, he should be allowed to examine the written statement which he
had requested. In People v. Walsh29 the Court stated that where a witness
testified to having made a written statement, and inspection by the presiding
judge reveals contradictory matter, its use for cross examination on the question
of credibility should be allowed.
The conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered with a lone dissent by
Judge Desmond on the ground that none of the matters discussed in the
majority opinion raised any substantial question of law.
ExcEssIwELY LONG JuRy TRmiT NOT A D.NIAL or DuE PROCESS
The question of whether an excessively long jury trial constitutes a denial
of due process has not been previously decided in the courts of New York State.
In general the requirement of due process is met if the defendant is accorded
a fair trial, conducted according to the law of the land.30 A denial of due
process has been defined as the failure to observe that fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice.31
The Court of Appeals in People v. Cle-mnte32 decided for the first .time
that the length of a trial is not an essential element in determining whether
due process of law has been satisfied. In this case the jury trial lasted for
14 months, and the Court of Appeals held that the trial may not be condemned
as a denial of due process solely because it lasted for 14 months. The test to
determine whether due process has been denied is whether under all the circum-
stances the defendants have been accorded a fair trial. The Court also indicated
that it is the responsibility of defense counsel to object to the introduction of
cumulative evidence which prolongs the trial unnecessarily, and that when
defense counsel fails in this respect, it must share responsibility for the length
of the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments of conviction of the
Appellate Division.
33
The argument of the defense in the instant case, that because the trial
was so lengthy and frequently interrupted (the trial was discontinued during
the summer months) and because the evidence and testimony were so over-
whelming in quantity, the jury could not reach a reasoned verdict, is rejected
by the Court of Appeals. To say that a long and complicated trial renders it
impossible for a jury to reach a just verdict would be to cast doubt on the
28. People v. Velleman, 247 App. Div. 172, 286 N.Y. Supp. 918 (lst Dep't 1936).
29. 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933).
30. People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 52 N.E. 572 (1899).
31. People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951).
32. 8 N.Y.2d 1, 200 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1960).
33. People v. Clemente, 9 A.D.2d 548, 190 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1959).
